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mony of the offending attorneys themselves showed the existence of
the conflict; the attorneys had previously represented one of the con-
flicting interests in this same probate proceeding. No formal con-
tempt proceedings are mentioned and the reprimand appears, there-
fore, to have been delivered not under the formal procedure of sec-
tions 2705.02 and 2705.03 of the Ohio Revised Code, which require
written notice and hearing, but under the power of a court to sum-
marily punish a person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of, or so
near the court as to obstruct the administration of justice.' 4
PHILIP K. YONGE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE MEANING OF JURISDICTION
The Ohio Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Beil v. Dota,z had be-
fore it a case which involved the basic elements of the concept of
jurisdiction. The proceedings were for contempt of the Common
Pleas Court of Mahoning County, which had issued a temporary in-
junction in an action instituted by the prosecuting attorney to "pad-
lock," as a common nuisance, premises used for gambling.2 The
statute permits the court to forbid any use whatever of the premises
for one year, and the trial court ordered that the premises in question
not be used for any purpose until further order of the courts. One
DeNiro was found present on the premises two days after the sheriff
padlocked them.
DeNiro contended that the evidence did not support even an in-
ference that he was on the premises for the purpose of gambling, and
that the portion of the trial court's order forbidding any other, and
possibly lawful, use of the premises for a year was void, on the
ground that such an order could not be made as a part of a temporary
injunction, but only in a permanent injunction after a final hearing.
The question presented for the supreme court's consideration was,
therefore, the difference between a void and a voidable order, and
between usurpation of jurisdiction and erroneous exercise of jurisdic-
tion.
Citing several landmark cases in this important area of the law,3
the supreme court pointed out that the temporary injunction had "not
been attacked by anyone through a proceeding on a motion to dis-
14. OHIO REV. CODE § 2705.01. For recent cases dealing with the power to punish for con-
tempt, see Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Franko, 167 Ohio St. 536, 150 N.E.2d 404 (1958),
Sonenfield, Attorneys at Law, Survey of Ohio Law - 1958, 10 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 344, 347
(1959); Fidelity Finance Co. v. Harris, 125 N.E.2d 812 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955), Sonenfield,
Attorneys at Law, Survey of Ohio Law - 1955, 7 WEsT. RES. L. REV. 230, 232 (1956); In
re Estate of Wright, 123 N.E.2d 52 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954), aff'd, 165 Ohio St. 15, 133 N.E.2d
350 (1956).
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solve or modify," that it is within the power granted to the common
pleas court, in a permanent injunction, to issue an order forbidding
the use or occupancy for any purpose of premises found to be a com-
mon nuisance by reason of gambling activities conducted thereon, and
that, therefore, its order must be obeyed, "regardless of whether such
power was imprudently or prematurely exercised in a temporary in-
junction."4  (Emphasis added.) Conceding the scope of the injunc-
tion to be too broad, there was but an erroneous exercise of an ex-
isting judicial power, not a usurpation of a non-existing judicial
power.
MINORS AS PARTIES
During the past few years, several cases have reached the su-
preme court involving the confusion which usually occurs when a
minor is a party to litigation, but his status is not disclosed at the
commencement thereof.5 It occurred again in 1959 in Taylor v.
Scott.6 In 1955, plaintiff filed a bastardy complaint against defend-
ant in the Portsmouth Municipal Court. Plaintiff was at that time
a minor and so testified at the arraignment at which defendant was
present and pleaded not guilty. No objection was made at that time
to plaintiff's want of capacity or to the absence from the affidavit of
a guardian or next friend, nor was the question raised in 1957 at the
trial in common pleas court on the merits. Complainant was by then
of full age. The jury found against the defendant, who thereupon,
for the first time, raised the question of the defect by an oral motion
for an order in arrest of judgment.
The trial court refused complainant leave to amend the original
complaint to add the name of complainant's mother as next friend
and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. Presumably, the
court felt compelled to do so by a Hamilton County Court of Appeals
decision.7
The Court of Appeals for Scioto County8 reversed and certified
the conflict to the supreme court, which upheld the Scioto County de-
cision and by implication overruled that of the Hamilton County case.
1. 168 Ohio St. 315, 154 N.E.2d 634 (1958). See also discussion in Equity section, p. 377
infra.
2. OHIo RBv. CoDE § 2915.02.
3. E.g., United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Harrigan
v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis. 127,99 N.W. 909 (1904).
4. State ex rel. Bell v. Dota, 168 Ohio St. 315, 321, 154 N.E.2d 634, 639 (1958).
5. See Ritzier v. Eckleberry, 167 Ohio St. 439, 149 N.E.2d 728 (1958); Canterbury v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 158 Ohio St. 68, 107 N.E.2d 115 (1952); Sonenfield, Civil Procedure,
Survey of Ohio Law - 1958, 10 WEsT. REs. L. Rmv. 354 (1959).
6. 168 Ohio St. 391, 155 N.E.2d 884 (1959). See also discussion in Domestic Relations
section, p. 376 infra.
7. State ex rel. Love v. Jones, 98 Ohio App. 45, 128 N.E.2d 228 (1953).
8. Opinion not reported.
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Bastardy proceedings are substantially civil in nature, at least so
far as procedure is concerned? Canterbury v. Pennsylvania Rail-
road'0 and Ritzler v. Eckleberry" established the rule that a court
has "virtually unlimited discretionary power to protect the rights of a
minor in an action' '1 2 under Ohio Revised Code section 2307.11.
While neither of those cases dealt with a bastardy action, prosecu-
tions of complaints under the bastardy sections 3 are, unless specified
otherwise therein, governed by the procedure provided for in the trial
of civil cases. Furthermore, unlike the situation in Canterbury and
Ritzler, in this case the minor had come of age prior to the trial of
the action, and her minority at the time of commencement of the ac-
tion was known to defendant. If the liberal power of amendment
given to the courts by Ohio Revised Code section 2309.58 was suffi-
cient to allow instanter amendment to protect the minor's rights in
the Canterbury and Ritzler cases, there was all the more reason why
it should have been sufficient in the instant case.
In Evans v. Evans, 4 however, there arose a somewhat different
problem concerning minors. In this action for divorce, both plaintiff
and defendant were minors. Plaintiff's action was brought by her
mother as next friend. Defendant and his father were both served
with process. They filed an answer and cross-petition, with which
plaintiff and her mother were both properly served. At this point
plaintiff withdrew her petition. Next, defendant filed an amended
cross-petition, with which plaintiff and her mother were both served,
but no guardian ad litem was ever appointed for plaintiff. Defend-
ant was subsequently granted a divorce from plaintiff, together with
other relief, on his amended cross-petition.
The court of appeals vacated this decree and remanded the case
for a new trial, holding that Ohio Revised Code sections 2307.16
and 2307.17 require the appointment of a guardian ad litem, and
that failure to do so constituted prejudicial error.
The result can probably be reconciled with that in the Ritzler case
on the ground that in the latter the case was actually defended,
whereas in Evans defendant obtained his divorce on his cross-petition
by default. The court of appeals in Evans seemed to feel very
strongly that coming as and when it did, defendant's cross-petition
was tantamount to the commencement of an original action in di-
vorce. With all due respect to the excellent court which decided the
case, the result, to this writer, appears a bit strained.
9. State ex rel. Gill v. Volz, 156 Ohio St. 60, 100 N.E.2d 203 (1951).
10. 158 Ohio St. 68, 107 N.E.2d 115 (1952).
11. 167 Ohio St. 439, 149 N.E.2d 728 (1958).
12. Taylor v. Scott, 168 Ohio St. 391, 394, 155 N.E.2d 884, 887 (1959).
13. OHIo REv. CODE §§ 3111.01-.24.
14. 161 N.E.2d 401 (Ohio Cr. App. 1959). See also discussion in Domestic Relations sec-
tion, p. 372 infra.
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VACATION OF JUDGMENTS
Courts in Ohio are given specific statutory authority to vacate
their judgments after term." One of the situations most frequently
giving rise to a petition for such relief is that of the judgment taken
on a cognovit note. There has been little agreement among the va-
rious appellate courts as to the duty of a trial court in passing upon
such a petition. The difficulty seems to stem from some past incon-
sistencies in the conduct and rulings of the supreme court, and also
from the fact that the considerations which surround the entry of a
judgment on a note with a cognovit feature are somewhat different
from those which attend other default judgments.
In the case of Livingstone v. Rebman," a majority of the supreme
court concurred in an opinion which should provide a guide to trial
courts in the future, at least in cases involving judgments on cognovit
notes. First of all, it is dear from the statute that, either on petition
after term or on motion within term, a judgment shall not be vacated
until it is adjudged that there is a valid defense to the action in which
the judgment was rendered. In its opinion, the supreme court seems
to put its approval upon the common practice of tendering an answer
to the original proceeding in order to establish the validity of the
defense.
As the court points out, the confusion begins at the point where
the court is enjoined first to pass upon the grounds asserted for vaca-
tion of the judgment before proceeding to decide upon the question
of the validity of the defense. Some grounds for vacation of judg-
ment can be passed upon without regard to the validity of the defense
tendered; others cannot, if, for example, the proof required to estab-
lish the ground is the same as the proof required to establish the ten-
dered defense, such as payment, forgery, limitations, or want or
failure of consideration.
Up to the time of the decision in Bulkley v. Greene,17 it appears
to have been well settled that even when the court in which vacation
was sought did decide that there were grounds for vacation, the case
was by no means ready for final vacation or modification. Before
such could be done, it must have been adjudged that there was a valid
defense to the action, and, in order that the validity of the defense
might be adjudged, an issue thereon should have been made up by
proper pleadings, and such issue should have been tried as in other
cases, i.e., by jury if one is demandable and not waived.' 8 Only after
it had been decided by such means that the tendered defense was in
15. OHIo REv. CODE §§ 2325.01-.13.
16. 169 Ohio St. 109, 158 N.E.2d 366 (1959).
17. 98 Ohio St. 55, 120 N.E. 216 (1918).
18. Lee v. Benedict, 82 Ohio St. 302, 92 N.E. 492 (1910); Follett v. Alexander, 58 Ohio
St. 202, 50 N.E. 720 (1898); Watson v. Paine, 25 Ohio St. 340 (1874); Frazier v. Williams,
24 Ohio St. 625 (1874).
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fact proved, could final judgment of vacation be entered; in the in-
terim, the proper course was suspension of the judgment, preserving
the liens and priorities thereof in the event that a similar judgment
should be rendered upon the trial of the cause.
Bulkley v. Greene had cast doubt on this procedure primarily for
the reason that it appears from the supreme court's opinion that "is-
sues were joined by the parties, not only on the ground set forth for
vacation, but also on the defenses set forth in the petition for vaca-
tion,"19 and this without the intervention of a jury and over the pro-
tests of the judgment debtor. The court's opinion in that case seems
to have approved the action of the trial court - hence the confusion.
The supreme court resolved the matter in Livingston v. Rebman20
and laid down the following rule, which is quoted in full, with the cau-
tion that it may in the future be held to apply only to petitions to va-
cate judgments taken on cognovit notes:
We conceive this to be the correct rule in the procedure under con-
sideration, where the proof of the ground for vacation is totally unrelated
to the proof of a defense. That is, where it is proved by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that one of the grounds for vacating a judgment
exists, and that proof does not involve proof of the defense, it is then
the duty of the court to look further to the defense. If the defense will
be effective if proved, the court should suspend the judgment and permit
the issues raised by the defense to be tried by a jury or, if a jury is
waived, by the court.
Where, however, proof of the ground that judgment was taken "upon
warrants of attorney for more than was due the plaintiff" is dependent
upon the same evidence that proves a defense, whether that defense be
one of payment, statute of limitations, forgery, lack of consideration, or
any other defense that would show that the judgment is for more than
was due, we conceive the duty of the trial judge to be similar to his
duty where he is confronted with a motion for a directed verdict at the
dose of all the evidence. That is, if there is credible evidence sup-
porting the defense (which would, as a matter of course, establish the
ground) from which reasonable minds may reach different conclusions,
it is then the duty of the court to suspend the judgment and permit the
issue raised by the pleadings to be tried by a jury or, if a jury is waived,
by the court.2 1
The court, in its syllabus, did not overrule Bulkey v. Greene, but
"questioned" paragraph one of the syllabus of that case. 21
PLEADING DAMAGES
In Falter v. City of Toledo,23 the supreme court put its seal of
approval upon a method of pleading damages to personalty which
has long been used, but which was heretofore of doubtful validity.
19. Bulkley v. Greene, 98 Ohio St. 55, 56, 120 N.E. 216 (1918).
20. 169 Ohio St. 109, 158 N.E.2d 366 (1959).
21. Id. at 121, 158 N.E.2d at 375.
22. Id. at syllabus 4.
23. 169 Ohio St. 238, 158 N.E.2d 893 (1959).
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The better way is to plead market values before and after, but it is
now also proper to plead the reasonable cost of repairs, provided that
such cost does not, upon proof, exceed the difference in market value
before and after the injury.
PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST
Ohio Revised Code section 2331.11 grants the privilege of free-
dom from arrest to "suitors... and witnesses while going to, attend-
ing, or returning from court." In 1957, the supreme court held, in
Zumsteg v. Aimerican Food Club, Incorporated,24 that the statute
does not grant a privilege from service of summons in a civil action,
and thereby overruled two cases of long-standing authority.2
In City of Akron v. Mingo,26 the supreme court had before it for
construction the provisions of the related code section, 2331.13,
which states that "sections 2331.11 to 2331.14, inclusive, of the Re-
vised Code do not extend to cases of treason, felony or breach of the
peace . . . " One Mingo had been tried in the Akron Municipal
Court on a charge of driving his automobile while under the influ-
ence of alcohol. At the conclusion of his trial the court discharged
him and he immediately left the courtroom. Having thus escaped
the frying pan he proceeded to land in the fire, for, while driving to
his home, he was arrested, place in jail, and charged under city ordi-
nances with driving through a red light and driving without a license.
He filed a motion for summary discharge, as provided by section
2331.14, contending that he was privileged from arrest, since he was
returning from court at the time.
Citing many authorities, both from this state and from other jur-
isdictions, the court held that "treason, felony and breach of the
peace" embrace all criminal cases and proceedings whatever; that
excluded from the privilege are all arrests and prosecutions for crimi-
nal offenses; and that, therefore, the privilege from arrest granted
by the legislature is confined to arrests in civil cases.
Therefore, under the Zurnsteg case, the privilege does not extend
to protection against service with process in a civil action, and under
the Mingo case, it does not protect against arrest, incarceration, and
trial for any criminal offense. It apparently covers only the com-
paratively narrow ground of arrest on civil process during attendance
at court and for a reasonable time in going and returning.
24. 166 Ohio St. 439, 143 N.E.2d 701 (1957), 9 WEsT. Rs. L. REV. 237 (1958).
25. Barber v. Knowles, 77 Ohio St. 81, 82 N.E. 1065 (1907); Andrews v. Lembeck, 46
Ohio St. 38, 18 N.E. 483 (1888).
26. 169 Ohio St. 511, 160 N.E.2d 225 (1959), affirming 108 Ohio App. 570, 162 N.E.2d
865 (1958); see also City of Troy v. Cummins, 107 Ohio App. 318, 159 N.E.2d 239 (1958).
See also discussion in Criminal Law section, p. 366 infra.
27. He also prayed for dismissal of the new charges, with prejudice, apparently under the
impression that the privilege for which he contended was not only an immunity from arrest,
but also from prosecution for that which brought about the arrest.
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THE EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
Habeas Corpus
The Court of Appeals for Summit County decided a question
which, though raised elsewhere, appears never to have been previous-
ly decided in Ohio. In In re Fincher,2 it was held that actual physi-
cal restraint of a person is necessary before it can be said that he is
restrained of his liberty and that when a prisoner has been released
on bond for appearance in court, he is not so restrained of his liberty
as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.
Mandamus Against Unincorporated Association
In State ex rel. Titler v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,"
the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County had before it the question
of whether a writ of mandamus should issue to compel a "voluntary"
unincorporated association to perform a duty to its members enjoined
upon it by its constitution, but not by any statute.
Following decisions in other jurisdictions, the court held that in
the absence of a statutory duty, and where no "public interest" is
involved, the writ of mandamus will not lie against an officer of an
unincorporated voluntary association.
Another issue, closely related to the action of mandamus, was
involved in State ex rel. Ross v. Guion.30 The case involved an at-
tempt to compel the Commissioner of Building and Housing to issue
a building permit to relator. The application complied in all respects
with the legal requirements for a building of the kind sought to be
built. The zoning ordinance permitted its erection on relator's land,
but respondent refused to issue a permit, contending that the specific
ordinance which rezoned relator's land for the present purpose was
invalid, as being "spot zoning."
The specific question for decision was whether a municipal admin-
istrative officer may raise the question of the unconstitutionality of
the statute or ordinance under which his duty to act is alleged to arise.
There is a general rule that unconstitutionality of a statute is not,
in the mouth of such an official, a defense in an action of mandamus,
unless his personal interests or rights will be affected, unless he will
incur personal liability, or will violate his oath of office, 3 1 or, unless
the law is a matter of general public interest.8 2
28. 107 Ohio App. 40, 156 N.E.2d 337 (1958).
29. 160 N.E.2d 321 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959). See also discussion in Labor Law section, p. 399
infra.
30. 161 N.E.2d 800 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
31. State ex rel. State Bridge Commission v. Griffith, 136 Ohio St. 334, 25 N.E.2d 847
(1940).
32. Trustees of Cass Township v. Dillon, 16 Ohio St. 38 (1864); Citizens Bank v. Wright,
6 Ohio St. 318 (1856).
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Admitting that the last mentioned basis of exception to the rule
"is not susceptible of accurate definition" (although cases in other
jurisdictions which had made an effort to do so were cited),-3 the
court of appeals in this case did "not deem the legislation which
changed the land of Mrs. Ross from a two-family residence zone to
a local retail business zone to be of general public interest." 4
GEOGRAPHICAL JURISDICTION OF MUNICIPAL COURTS
The issue in Rose v. Associates Discount Corporation5 was the
jurisdiction of a municipal court, in enforcing and collecting a judg-
ment rendered by it in a matter wherein its jurisdiction was unques-
tioned, to issue orders in aid of execution to the sheriff of another
county for service on a garnishee residing therein, so as to bind funds
of the judgment debtor in the hands of the garnishee. The supreme
court decided that such jurisdiction does not exist under the code.
Ohio Revised Code sections 1901.02, 1901.18, and 1901.19 provide
generally that municipal courts have jurisdiction within the corporate
limits of their respective corporations, and within the limits of the
county or counties in which their territories are situated. But sec-
tions 1901.13 and 1901.23 are not to be construed to permit the
exercise of power outside that county, except to serve parties original-
ly made defendants in the action. A garnishee is not ordinarily a
defendant in the original action.
JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF ON CROSS-PETITION IN DIVORCE
In Locke v. Locke, 6 plaintiff filed a petition for divorce from
his wife, a resident of Wales, with an affidavit for service by publi-
cation. Defendant, by her attorneys, filed a motion for temporary
alimony and support of their minor children, which was granted.
Next, plaintiff filed an amended petition, followed by an answer
and cross-petition by defendant in which she prayed for affirmative
relief. Then, plaintiff dismissed his amended petition, leaving the
question of whether the court had jurisdiction over the plaintiff as
to orders which had been and might be made upon him. Since ser-
vice had been made on plaintiff on defendant's cross-petition, the
court held that it still had jurisdiction over him, both as to orders
made prior to such service and those made subsequent thereto.
SAMUEL SONENFIELD
33. State ex rel. Ross v. Guion, 161 N.E.2d 800, 803 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
34. Id. at 804.
35. 169 Ohio St. 321, 159 N.E.2d 459 (1959).
36. 161 NE.2d 798 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
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